信息披露情况对经理薪酬契约的影响研究  

Study on the Impact of Information Disclosure on Manager Compensation Contract

作　　者：缪毅[1] 胡奕明[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

出　　处：《投资研究》2014年第5期120-129,共10页Review of Investment Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"管理会计视角的多重价值场域中的经济性激励及其效果研究"(71272114)

摘　　要：基于深圳证券交易所发布的上市公司信息披露考核结果,本文以2008-2012年间深交所的A股上市公司为研究对象,从薪酬契约的角度实证检验了信息披露的治理角色。结果显示,高质量的信息披露使得公司的股东在经理人员的薪酬契约设计中赋予了会计盈余更多的权重,说明信息披露提高了会计信息的有效性,有助于更好地对经理进行薪酬激励,从而发挥了间接的治理作用。进一步的研究还发现,当信息不对称问题比较严重时,薪酬契约的设计更依赖于信息披露的质量情况,信息披露质量对薪酬契约的影响在国有企业和市场环境较为落后的地区表现地更为明显。Based on the evaluation results of the listing company＇s information disclosure by Shenzhen Stock Exchange, we ex- plore the governance effect of information disclosure. We find that the pay-performance sensitivity is higher in the company with better information disclosure quality. And it shows that information disclosure improve the efficiency of the accounting in- formation, and the accounting earnings are assigned larger weights in the managers＇ compensation contract. We further find that the effects of information disclosure on compensation contract are much more obvious in the State-owned enterprises and in the companies which are in the poor market environment.

关 键 词：信息披露 公司治理 委托代理理论 薪酬业绩敏感度 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济]