市场化水平、管理层权力与高管薪酬激励  

Marketization Level,Management Power and Executive Compensation Incentive

作　　者：曹慧[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京城市学院,北京100083

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2014年第15期124-128,共5页Science and Technology Management Research

摘　　要：实证研究在高管薪酬激励过度和激励不足两种不同情形下,市场化水平和管理层权力对高管薪酬激励的影响。结果发现,在高管薪酬激励不足时,市场化水平较高的地区,激励不足的现象会有所改善;在高管薪酬激励过度时,市场化水平较高的地区,激励过度的现象会更严重。不管在激励不足时,还是激励过度时,自利的高管都是尽可能利用手中的权力提高自身薪酬,即管理层权力越大,高管薪酬水平越高。The paper has empirically investigated the influence of marketization level and management power to executive compensation incentive which can be divided into excessive incentive and deficient incentive.The results indicate that （1 ） the level of deficient incentive will be alleviated and the level of excessive incentive will be exacerbated in the higher mar-ketization level area,（2）whether in the condition of deficient incentive or excessive incentive,the greater power execu-tives have,the more compensation executives can obtain.It suggests that executive compensation would increase continu-ously with the effects of external and internal corporate governance mechanism.Therefore,an effective supervision and re-straint mechanism should be established urgently.

关 键 词：市场化水平 管理层权力 高管薪酬 激励过度 激励不足 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]