风投介入与创业企业高管薪酬  

Impacts of Venture Capital on Executive Compensation of GEM Companies

作　　者：钱燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]苏州大学东吴商学院,江苏苏州215021

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2014年第12期73-77,129,共5页Communication of Finance and Accounting

摘　　要：本文以我国2009-2011年在创业板首次公开上市的281家公司为样本,研究风险投资的介入是否对创业企业的高管薪酬产生影响。结果发现:与无风险投资参与的公司相比,有风险投资参与的公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性较高;不同特征的风险投资公司对创业企业高管薪酬有着不同的影响,持股时间长、持股比例高、非国有背景与单一投资的风险投资支持的创业企业,其公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性高。这表明,风险投资的介入缓解了委托代理问题,提高了公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性,改善了我国创业企业的公司治理水平。Using 281 companies listed on Shenzhen Growth Enterprises Market(GEM) during 2009-2011 as samples,this paper examines the influences of Venture Capital(VC) on executive compensation of GEM Companies.The results show that:Pay for performance sensivity of VC-funded companies was signigirantly higher than those of non-VC-funded ones.Different characteristics of venture capital such as shareholding ratio,investment duration,syndication and government background have different impacts on executive compensation of VC-funded companies.

关 键 词：风险投资 高管薪酬 公司治理 薪酬业绩敏感性 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济]