高管薪酬决定的调整:锚定效应理论透视  

The Adjustment of Executive Compensation Determination:A Theoretical Perspective of Peer Benchmarking

作　　者：黄再胜[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京政治学院上海校区,上海200433

出　　处：《广东财经大学学报》2015年第1期83-95,共13页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(2010CGL056)

摘　　要：基于2007年-2011年A股上市公司数据,实证考察了高管薪酬决定的锚定效应及其驱动因素。研究发现,公司高管薪酬决定存在明显的锚定效应,即同行企业高管薪酬水平对公司高管薪酬增长具有显著的正向预测作用,并且这种效应在国有控股企业表现得更加明显。进一步研究显示,高管薪酬支付相对不足时,公司高管薪酬决定的锚定效应更加显著,但这一交互作用主要存在于公司治理质量较好的国有控股公司中。这表明,至少在国有控股上市公司中,高管薪酬决定的锚定效应并非源自于公司管理层的薪酬操纵,而主要体现为董事会为维护和促进公司薪酬竞争力而实施的一种薪酬调整。This paper empirically studies the peer benchmarking in the determination of executive com- pensation and its driving factors in Chinese A-share firms based on the data from 2007 to 2011. It finds that peer benehmarking exists apparently in the setting process of top management pay. That is, the median executive compensation of peer firms has a significant explanatory power in predicting the focal firm＇s executive compensation increase in the subsequent year. Furthermore, this kind of effect manifests most in statedowned companies. The further study reveals that peer benchmarking becomes more significant as long as top management is relatively underpaid; but this interactive influence mainly exists in well-governed statedowned companies. These findings show that at least in stated-owned companies, the peer benchmarking in the determination of executive compensation is a manifestation of compensation adjustment by the board in order to sustain and enhance the firm＇s compensation competitiveness, rather than being driven by self-interests of top management.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 锚定效应 薪酬操纵 薪酬调整 公司治理 股权性质 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F224