外部董事与高管薪酬激励:经理市场的调节作用——基于民营上市公司的经验研究  

Outside Directors and Top Management Compensation:the Role of Managerial Labor Market——Evidence from Family Listed Companies in China

作　　者：袁春生[1] 唐松莲[2] 

机构地区：[1]江西师范大学财政金融学院,江西南昌330022 [2]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2015年第5期84-99,共16页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71262025);国家自然科学基金项目(71002052)

摘　　要：以2007~2013年民营上市公司为样本,考察外部董事是否会改善高管薪酬激励机制,以及经理市场发育对外部董事与高管薪酬业绩敏感度和薪酬粘性关系的影响。研究发现：外部董事比例越高,高管薪酬越高,薪酬业绩敏感度下降,且董事薪酬业绩敏感度下降幅度高于经理层;外部董事比例越高,高管薪酬粘性越弱,且经理薪酬粘性下降幅度大于董事;发育较好的经理市场可促使外部董事提高经理薪酬业绩敏感度,降低经理薪酬粘性,但经理市场促使外部董事提高董事薪酬业绩敏感度及降低董事薪酬粘性的作用有限。研究结果表明,外部董事提升高管薪酬激励机制有效性的作用有限,发达的经理市场可促使外部董事改善经理薪酬激励效果。Using the samples of family listed companies from year 2007 to 2013 in China, this paper investigates whether outside directors improve top management compensation incentive, and the effects of managerial labor market on the relationships between outside directors and top management pay performance sensitivity or compensation stickiness. The results show that,the higher the proportion of outside directors, the higher top management compensation, the pay performance sensitivity will decrease, and directors＇ pay performance sensitivity is decreased more than that of executives; the higher the proportion of outside directors, the weaker the compensation stickiness of top management, and executives＇ compensation stickiness is decreased more than that of directors; well-developed managerial labor market can urge outside directors to improve the executives＇ pay performance sensitivity and reduce the executives＇ compensation stickiness, but the effects of managerial labor market on urging outside directors to improve directors＇ pay performance sensitivity and reducing directors＇ compensation stickiness are limited. The results above mean that the role of outside directors in improving the effectiveness of top management compensation incentive mechanisms is limited, while the developed managerial labor market can urge outside directors to improve the effectiveness of executives＇ compensation.

关 键 词：外部董事 经理市场 高管薪酬 薪酬业绩敏感度 薪酬粘性 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]