施泰因的同感现象学是先验的吗?  

Is Edith Stein's Phenomenology of Empathy Transcendental?

作　　者：郁欣[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学马克思主义学院

出　　处：《世界哲学》2015年第3期14-20,160,共7页World Philosophy

基　　金：2013年度广东省哲学社会科学"十二五"规划项目(立项编号:GD13YZX01);2012年度国家社科基金青年项目(项目编号:12CZX047);"中山大学高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助"项目(编号1409115)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：由于对《观念Ⅰ》时期胡塞尔根本立场的不完全理解,施泰因的同感现象学的研究起点与研究目标之间存在着不协调。一方面,同感现象学研究的起点是胡塞尔的"先验现象学"式的,这意味着对同感现象学的本质分析将集中于现象学还原以后的纯粹意识领域;另一方面,同感现象学研究的目标或意图在一定意义上又是实在论现象学式的,或者是一种"现象学的实在论"。施泰因从根本上拒绝将构造问题与"观念论"的立场相联,最终,她所发展的就既不是传统的实在论,也不是传统的观念论,而是一种特殊的、温和的先验观念论。Based on Edith Stein's partial understanding of Husserl's fundamental position during the period of Ideen I,the start point and goal of the research of her phenomenology of empathy is not in accord with each other.On the one hand,the start point of her phenomenology of empathy takes the form of Husserl's 'transcendental phenomenology'.It implies that the essential analysis on the phenomenology of empathy will focus on the field of pure consciousness after the phenomenological reduction.On the other hand,the goad or intention of her phenomenology of empathy,in a sense,takes the form of realismphenomenology,or is a 'phenomenological realism'.She absolutely rejected to connect the issue of constitution with the position of 'idealism'.In the end,she developed a special mild transcendental idealism which is different from the traditional realism and the traditional idealism.

关 键 词：现象学 同感 观念论 实在论 先验的 施泰因 

分 类 号：B516.52[哲学宗教—外国哲学]