组织权力配置对企业业绩和高管薪酬的影响  

Impact of Organizational Power Structure on Corporate Performance and Executive Compensation

作　　者：李四海[1] 江新峰[1] 张敦力[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《经济管理》2015年第7期105-115,共11页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"社会责任投入权衡;信誉资本和公司价值创造"(71372166)

摘　　要：本文利用中国沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究了两职分离或两职合一的权力配置对企业业绩与高管个人薪酬的影响。研究发现,两职分离或两职合一的权力配置与企业业绩并不存在显著的相关性;相反,对高管个人的效用产生了显著影响。具体表现在两职分离相比于两职合一,会显著降低高管的薪酬水平,同时也会降低其薪酬业绩敏感性,主要表现在业绩上升时的薪酬业绩敏感性。研究发现,两职合一权力配置的获得与董事长个人社会资本显著相关,拥有政治资本、政治资本级别越高以及政治资本在管理者团队中越稀缺的高管,更容易获得两职合一的权力配置。本文研究的结论表明,作为公司治理的重要制度安排,两职分离或两职合一在企业层面实现了帕累托最优,是企业基于自身组织特征的理性选择;而对于高管个人而言,其基于自身效用最大化的考虑,可能存在两职合一的选择偏好。但是,这种选择偏好的实现依赖自身的社会资本。本文的研究从企业层面和高管个人层面探讨了两职分离或两职合一的经济后果,打开了权力配置的黑箱,同时,为人力资源理论、管理者权力理论在管理者薪酬契约中的应用提供了经验证据。Chairman of the board and CEO are two key positions in modem corporations. The arrangement of these two positions will have a profound impact on ompany＇ s corporate governance and its efficiency. However, the arrangement of these two positions is quite different in different countries. According to statistics, America compa- nies with the same person on the position of Chairman and CEO accounted for 65% in 2007. Even in 2012, this proportion was still 57%. But in Britain and Germany, according to the law, the two positions must be held by dif- ferent people. In the past ten years, the proportion of company whose Chairman and CEO held by the same person in China has been maintained at about 25%. Whether the position of Chairman and CEO are held by one person or two persons is actually a question of power allocation. Previous literature mainly discusses the factors affecting this process, including firm size, ownership structure, ownership characteristics. Some scholars also studied the effect of the arrangement on the performance of enterprises. Actually from the perspective of rational economic people, whether the position of Chairman and CEO are held by one person or two persons is the enterprise internal selection based on the characteristics of its organization, if large sample evidence indicates the arrangement has correlation with corporate performance, it means the enterprise internal selection based on organization feature selection does not achieve Pareto Optimality, or due to the interference of non-efficiency factors of the power allocation. In the traditional enterprise theory, enterprise is regarded as the ＂black box＂ of input and output, the modern enterprise theory emphasizes the role of entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurial spirit. As rational people will always pursue their own utility maximization, managers have an incentive to use enterprise resources to realize their own interests. A reasonable and direct way is compensation. Managerial power theory believes that when the Chairman and CE

关 键 词：两职分离 两职合一 企业业绩 薪酬业绩敏感性 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]