董事薪酬、CEO薪酬与公司未来业绩:监督还是合谋?  

Director's Compensation,CEO's Compensation and Firm's Future Performance: Supervision or Collusion?

作　　者：朱滔[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,510632

出　　处：《会计研究》2015年第8期49-56,97,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71102041;71572069);广东省哲学社会科学"十一五"规划项目(GD10YYJ10);广东省级学科人文社科类专项(2013WYXM0181);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(暨南远航计划)资助

摘　　要：本文从薪酬视角,对董事与CEO之间的关联关系进行了研究。研究发现:"董事监督薪酬"与CEO薪酬正相关,同时对公司未来业绩有显著的正向影响,"董事超额薪酬"也与CEO薪酬正相关,但对公司未来业绩有显著的负向影响,中介效应检验显示"董事监督薪酬"和"董事超额薪酬"对公司未来业绩的影响分别有15.37%和40.54%是通过CEO薪酬安排这一途径间接实现的,表明目前董事与CEO之间兼具监督和合谋两种效应,但合谋效应要强于监督效应。此外,还发现董事薪酬和CEO薪酬的影响因素高度趋同,股权集中度的提高可以替代董事监管。总体而言,研究结果表明进一步厘清董事和CEO的职能差异,重视董事监督职能相匹配的薪酬设计是提高公司业绩的重要途径。The paper focuses on the impact of director's compensation on CEO's compensation,and its economic consequences. The empirical results show that although director's supervision compensation and excess compensation are both positively related to CEO's compensation,but the effects on firm's future performance are dramatically different. The higher director's supervision compensation is,the better the future performance is. However,the higher director's excess compensation causes worse future performance. Additionally,the paper finds that ownership concentration enhances shareholder's direct supervision over the CEO,which decreases the needs for director's supervision. In all,the relationship between director and CEO is complicated. It could be supervision or collusion.

关 键 词：董事薪酬 CEO薪酬 三层代理框架 中介效应 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]