内外部所有权交互对家族企业薪酬影响研究  

On the Impact of the Interaction with Internal and External Ownership on Family Businesses Salary

作　　者：辛金国[1] 乐毕君 

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学信息化与经济社会发展研究中心,浙江杭州310018 [2]宁波市市政公用工程安全质量监督站,浙江宁波315000

出　　处：《杭州电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第5期6-12,共7页Journal of Hangzhou Dianzi University：Social Sciences

基　　金：浙江省自然科学基金项目(LY13G020027);浙江省哲学社会科学重点研究基地课题(13JDWZ02Z)

摘　　要：现代家族企业普遍存在的内外部所有权交互作用将导致严重的委托代理问题,作为降低代理成本的高管薪酬激励与所有权结构关系研究显得非常重要。文章以我国上市家族公司中小板企业为对象,实证研究其内外部所有权交互安排对其薪酬的影响。研究结果显示:家族内外部所有权集中度的交互影响与高管薪酬激励呈显著正相关关系,家族内外部管理权集中度的交互影响与高管薪酬也呈显著正相关关系。There exist widespread interactions of internal and external ownership in modern family businesses,which will result in a severe principal-agent problem. It is significant to study how to reduce the executive compensation incentive as the agency cost and the ownership structure relationship. This article takes our country＇s middle and small capital stocks of the family businesses as the object of the study to make an empirical study on the impact of interaction with internal and external ownership on the family businesses salary. The results show that the interaction with the internal and external ownership concentration is positively correlated with the executive compensation incentives,and the interaction with the internal and external management concentration is also positively correlated with the executive compensation incentives.

关 键 词：家族企业 内外部所有权结构 交互影响 高管薪酬激励 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]