从性命之分看孟子性善  

On Mencius' Goodness of Human Nature from the Distinction of Human Nature and fate

作　　者：李世平[1] 

机构地区：[1]中共西安市委党校哲学教研部,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《宝鸡文理学院学报（社会科学版）》2015年第6期22-25,共4页Journal of Baoji University of Arts and Sciences：Social Science Edition

摘　　要：孟子言性有两个不同方面,一方面是顺随众人言性而言性,性是人生而就有的本能,另一方面是孟子自己对性的全新的理解与规定,即认为性不仅应当是人生而就有的本能,而且还应当有能力真正实现它。孟子性命之分在于:既是本能又能真正实现的是性,是本能但无法真正实现的是命。如此规定,仁义礼智就是性,耳目之欲就不是性而是命,孟子正是在此意义上言性善的。Mencius discusses human nature from two aspects. On the one hand, Mencius perceives human nature just as ordinary people do. Human nature is instinct. On the other hand, Mencius explains his own understanding that human nature is not only instinct hut also can he a- chieved, while fate is instinct but can not be. According to Mencius, RenYi LiZhi is human nature, whereas bodily desire is just fate. It is in this sense that Mencius discusses the Goodness of Human nature.

关 键 词：孟子 性 命 性善 

分 类 号：B222.5[哲学宗教—中国哲学]