顾客参与制造企业服务创新的激励博弈分析  

Game analysis about incentive of customer participation in service innovation of manufacturing enterprise

作　　者：和征[1,2] 陈菊红[1] 李小惠[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,西安710054 [2]西安工程大学管理学院,西安710048

出　　处：《计算机工程与应用》2016年第3期241-246,265,共7页Computer Engineering and Applications

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(No.71272117);陕西省普通高校哲学社会科学特色学科建设项目(陕教位[2009]6号);陕西省社科联2013年度重大理论与现实问题研究项目(No.2013Z023)

摘　　要：为了激励顾客参与制造企业服务创新,分析了顾客参与服务创新的动机,建立了顾客参与服务创新激励的演化博弈模型,并作均衡分析。给出一些激励顾客参与服务创新的策略。研究表明,当制造企业激励顾客参与服务创新时,它们各自获得的收益增加值越大,投机收益值越小,各自所付出的成本越小,双方越趋向于采取制造企业采取激励策略,顾客采取参与策略的演化稳定策略。In order to encourage customer to participate in service innovation of manufacturing enterprise, the motivation of customer participation in service innovation is analyzed. The evolutionary game model of incentive of customer participation in service innovation is established, and the equilibrium is analyzed. Some incentive countermeasures are given to encourage customer to participate in service innovation. The study shows that when manufacturing enterprise encourages customer to participate in service innovation, the added value of their benefit is more greater, the value of their speculative benefit is more smaller, their cost is more smaller, and they more tend to adopt the evolutionary stable policy that is manufacturing enterprise adopts incentive policy, and customer adopts participation policy.

关 键 词：顾客参与 服务创新 制造企业服务创新 激励机制 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]