经理人市场对高管薪酬的影响——来自高管跳槽现象的证据  

Effects of Managerial Labor Market on Executive Compensation: Evidence From Executive Job-hopping

作　　者：余国杰[1] 宫元[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《科学决策》2016年第2期19-38,共20页Scientific Decision Making

摘　　要：基于2007-2014年A股上市公司数据,从高管跳槽现象的视角,对经理人市场如何影响高管薪酬进行探究。研究发现,公司在发生高管跳槽之后会显著提高现任高管的薪酬,尤其是基于股权的薪酬。现任高管的薪酬提升幅度与其在经理人市场上的流动性有关,也与跳槽高管的特征(对原公司的重要性、新工作的吸引力)有关。同时,通过引入倾向得分匹配(PSM)模型,发现发生高管跳槽的公司在事前有显著的薪酬劣势,而事后的加薪使这些公司显著的薪酬劣势消失。另外,加薪措施能够有效地防止现任高管的跳槽。研究结果说明,经理人市场中的高管跳槽行为是公司薪酬政策的重要决定因素之一。Based on the data of A-share companies in the period of 2007 to 2014, this paper shed light on how the managerial labor market influences executive compensation from the perspective of executive job-hopping. We find that companies dramatically raise their incumbent executives＇ pay, especially equity-based pay, after losing executives to other firms. The magnitude of pay raise is not only related to incumbent executives＇ mobility in managerial labor market but also to job-hoppers＇ characteristics. Using PSM model, we find that a company＇s subsequent pay raise to incumbent executives after losing an executive diminishes its deficiency in executive compensation relative to its peer firms, and is effective at retaining its incumbent executives. Overall, our evidence suggests that executive job-hopping activity in managerial labor market has significant effect on firms＇ compensation policies.

关 键 词：经理人市场 高管薪酬 高管跳槽 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]