视角物理主义对知识论证的反驳  

Intuition under Knowledge Argument and Perspective Physicalism

作　　者：刘明海[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中师范大学马克思主义学院,武汉430079

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2016年第3期20-26,共7页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目"东西方心灵哲学及其比较研究"(12&ZD120)

摘　　要：在当代心灵哲学中,大多数哲学家对知识论证的反驳是不成功的,根源于他们无法割舍现象知识背后的二元论直觉。现象知识就是普通民众在比照物理知识基础上,通过直觉的臆测、猜想而对现象事实加工形成的。当代神经生物学成果表明,现象事实是大脑神经元集群的综合信息表征,是通过人类内在感官所呈现出来的。因此,人们是从不同的视角来描述大脑神经活动的,可称为视角物理主义。视角物理主义反驳了知识论证,也说明了心理感受性等现象事实的实在性和复杂性。In current philosophy of mind, majority of philosophers ＇ objection to knowledge argument are not successful, since they don ＇t abandon a dualist intuition behind phenomenal knowledge. The intuition results from folk people ＇s assumption and speculation of phenomenal facts in the light of physical facts. Current neurobiological achievements suggest that phenomenal fact is a combined characterization of brain neural ensembles, and presented in human being＇s inner sensation. People report and describe brain neural activities from different perspectives, which could be called per-spectivalist physicalism. Perspectivalist physicalism contradicts knowledge argument, explains reality and complexity of phenomenal fact about mental experience or qualia.

关 键 词：知识论证 直觉思维 现象事实 现象知识 神经生物学 视角主义 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]