管理层权力、薪酬标杆与高管薪酬制定  

Management Power,Compensation Benchmark and Executive Compensation

作　　者：任广乾[1] 

机构地区：[1]郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2016年第2期78-85,159-160,共8页Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"竞争与制度交互下的公司金融契约治理:行为分析与实验检验"(U1304705);河南省高校科技创新人才支持计划项目(人文社科类);河南省首批青年文化英才支持计划项目(社科理论类);河南省高等学校重点科研项目"基于公司治理视角的河南省国有企业混合所有制改革研究"(16A630032)

摘　　要：本文分析了管理层权力通过薪酬标杆的选取影响自身薪酬制定的过程和机理，并以2011～2014年我国A股上市公司为研究对象，实证检验管理层权力对上市公司高管薪酬的影响，探究了薪酬标杆在管理层权力和高管薪酬制定之中的传导作用。实证结果表明，管理层权力以及薪酬标杆与上市公司高管薪酬均存在正相关关系，上市公司高管利用管理层权力影响薪酬制定的路径之一，是通过影响董事会对薪酬标杆的选取进而达到操纵自身薪酬的目的。Firstly,we analyze the process and mechanism of executive compensation formulation impacted by management power through the selection of the compensation benchmark.And then,we verify the impact of managerial power on the listed companies' executive compensation based on the Ashare listed companies from 2011 to 2014and explore the mediating role of compensation benchmark between executive compensation and management power.The results show that the management power and compensation benchmark are both positively correlated with executive compensation.And we find that one possible way influencing compensation formulation used by listing corporation executives is through the influence of the board of directors on the choice of compensation benchmark so as to achieve the purpose of manipulating their own executive compensation.

关 键 词：管理层权力 薪酬标杆 高管薪酬 薪酬制定 薪酬契约论 

分 类 号：F272.923[经济管理—企业管理]