高管薪酬激励与费用粘性克服——基于“薪酬差距”和“薪酬溢价”视角的实证检验  

Executive Compensation Incentives' Anti-Sticky Effect on Expense——An Empirical Test about Pay Gap and Salary Premium

作　　者：孙维章[1] 王灿[2] 干胜道[2] 

机构地区：[1]山东工商学院会计学院,山东烟台264005 [2]四川大学商学院,四川成都610065

出　　处：《经济经纬》2016年第3期96-101,共6页Economic Survey

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(13BJY015);国家自然科学基金项目(71302132);山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2014GP004)

摘　　要：笔者从高管薪酬溢价和高管薪酬差距两个角度实证检验了高管薪酬激励的费用粘性克服特征,并从市场化程度、行业、股东性质等角度,进一步检验和分析了高管薪酬激励的费用粘性克服效果。研究发现我国上市公司的费用具有明显的粘性特征,高管薪酬激励能有效克服费用粘性;相比落后地区,发达地区上市公司中高管薪酬激励的粘性克服效果较差;两种高管激励方式的粘性克服效果存在行业差异;国有上市公司中,高管薪酬激励的粘性克服效果非常显著,非国有上市公司中则不显著。In this study, the author tested the anti-sticky effect of compensation incentives （contain both pay gap and salary premium）empirically and studied the changes of compensation incentives＇ anti-sticky effect when market, industry and shareholder are different.Results show that the expense of List Companies in China is significantly ＂sticky＂ and compensation incentives are anti-sticky. Compa-ring to developed area, compensation incentives of the companies in undeveloped area are more effective in reducing stickiness. Com-pensation incentives of non-manufacturing companies reduce stickiness significantly but not in manufacturing companies. Compensationincentives of SOEs reduce stickiness significantly but not in non-SOEs.

关 键 词：薪酬差距 薪酬溢价 费用粘性 企业性质 

分 类 号：F276.44[经济管理—企业管理]