基于公平偏好信息不对称的知识共享博弈分析  

作　　者：魏光兴[1] 唐瑶[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《企业经济》2016年第7期105-109,共5页Enterprise Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于偏好结构与群体规范互动机理的激励机制设计"(项目编号:71102165)

摘　　要：针对员工公平偏好作为个人特征是一种不对称信息的事实,建立公平偏好信息不对称条件下的知识共享博弈模型,分析公平偏好、信息不对称等对知识共享的影响机理。研究表明:公平偏好能够促进知识共享,但是不能保证知识共享一定会实现,因为存在多个均衡结果;当公平偏好信息不对称时,只有在认为博弈对方也是公平偏好者的可能性较大时才可能实现知识共享,并且一旦认为对方是公平偏好者的可能性足够大时,就能够确保知识共享一定会实现,因为此时只有唯一的均衡结果。因此,培养员工公平偏好和提高行为预期,既是促进知识共享的两条措施,也是企业文化建设的重要内容。By incorporating the asymmetric information of fairness preferences, this paper develops a game model to describe knowl- edge sharing, by which the influence of the fairness preferences and the asymmetric information is analyzed respectively. It is found that the fairness preferences can promote knowledge sharing, but it can＇t ensure that it will be realized certainly because there are many equilibria. Under the asymmetric fairness preference information, the knowledge sharing certainly can be realized as long as the probability that the partners are considered as agents preferring fairness is big enough because there is a unique equilibrium. Consequently, both the cultivation of the fairness preferences and the enhancement of the expectations on cooperative behaviors are useful for knowledge sharing, which should be an important part of the constrnction of corporation culture.

关 键 词：公平偏好 信息不对称 知识共享 企业文化 

分 类 号：C961[经济管理—人力资源管理]