国企分类治理、政府控制与高管薪酬激励——基于中国上市公司的实证研究  

Classified Governance of State-owned Enterprises,Government Control and the Executive Compensation Incentive——Empirical Research Based on Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：陈霞[1] 马连福[2] 丁振松[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京物资学院商学院,北京101149 [2]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071

出　　处：《管理评论》2017年第3期147-156,共10页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71372093);国家自然科学基金重点项目(71132001);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(10JJD630001)

摘　　要：本文选取2006-2013年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证分析了不同类别国有企业高管薪酬激励对公司绩效影响的差异。研究结果表明,在竞争类国有企业中,高管薪酬激励能够显著促进公司绩效,而公共服务类国有企业和特定功能类国有企业的高管薪酬激励效果不显著。并且,与非国有企业相比,竞争类国有企业的高管薪酬激励对公司绩效的促进作用更大。另外,本文发现,随着政府控制力的增强,竞争类国有企业高管薪酬激励效果受到抑制。因此,为了进一步提升国有企业薪酬激励机制的有效性,政府应当逐步放宽对竞争类国企的控制力度。同已有研究不同,本文突出了不同类别国有企业高管薪酬激励效果的差异。在我国国有企业进入分类改革的新阶段,具有一定的理论与现实意义。In this paper,we use the data of Chinese listed companies from 2006 to 2013 to examine the difference of executive compensation incentive effect in three categories of state-owned enterprises. We find that the executive compensations have positive effect on firm performance in competitive state-owned companies,but have no effect in the other two types. Furthermore,we find the effect is greater in competitive state-owned companies,compared with the non state-owned listed companies. Also,we find that in the competitive stateowned listed companies,as the power of government control increases,the executive compensation incentive effect is weakened. Therefore,in order to enhance the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive in state-owned enterprises,the government should loosen the control over competitive state-owned companies gradually. Unlike the existing researches,this paper highlights the differences of executive compensation incentive between different types of state-owned enterprise. In the new stage of classified reform of Chinese stateowned enterprises,this research has certain theoretical and practical significance.

关 键 词：国企分类 政府控制 高管薪酬 激励效果 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济] D630[政治法律—政治学]