基于动态博弈的横向监督与团队激励的关系研究  

The study on the relationship between peer monitoring and team incentive based on dynamic game

作　　者：王艳梅[1] 赵希男[1] 孙世敏[1] WANG Yan-mei ZHAO Xi-nan SUN Shi-min(School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China)

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2017年第2期162-169,共8页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年基金资助项目(71202154;71072122);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(N120406006)

摘　　要：基于动态博弈,以激励的动态一致性为切入点研究横向监督与团队激励的关系。首先,以横向监督存在为前提,分析激励动态一致与激励动态不一致两种情形下横向监督的类型与性质,分别得到正向监督与平衡型监督。然后,分别建立无横向监督时激励动态一致的博弈模型与激励动态不一致的博弈模型、存在横向监督时激励动态一致的博弈模型与激励动态不一致的博弈模型,根据得到的均衡解做进一步分析,得出结论:1与无横向监督相比,激励动态一致时产生的正向监督对团队产生了正效应;而激励动态不一致时产生的平衡型监督对团队产生了负效应。2激励动态一致时,员工努力程度及企业总收益会随着横向监督水平的提高而提高;而激励动态不一致时,横向监督水平与棘轮效应越大团队遭受的损失就越大。3 4种情况下的企业总收益排序为:激励动态一致且存在正向监督时、激励动态一致且无横向监督时、激励动态不一致且无横向监督时、激励动态不一致且存在平衡型监督时。因此,为了提高团队绩效,企业需要保证激励动态一致同时争取建立正向监督机制。Using peer monitoring to stimulate employees＇ job involvement is a new management trend of the contemporary era. In theory research, Kandel et al （1992） analyzed the conditions of stimulating peer monitoring which can mitigate ＂free riders＂ under partnership. Since then, many researchers have focusedon peer monitoring. The existing research is based on unrealistic static game. In real situations, the interaction of employees and company is a dynamic game. Itis well-known that an important aspect of dynamic game is the incentive dynamic consistency which doesn＇t exist in static game. Using dynamic game, thispaper analyzes how incentive dynamic consistency influences peer monitoring firstly. Two types of peer monitoring are conducted. Secondly, the relationshipbetween peer monitoring and team incentive has been studied under incentive dynamic consistency and incentive dynamic inconsistency. Finally, the generalconclusions about peer monitoring and team incentive have been obtained by comparing optimal equilibrium. The first part discusses the implications and conditions of peer monitoring review. The second part analyzes the impact of incentive dynamic consistencyon peer monitoring based on dynamic game. The results show that under incentive dynamic consistency, the team will encourage hard work while opposingshirking. This type of peer monitoring has been defined by positive monitoring. On the contrary, under incentive dynamic inconsistency the team will opposehard work while opposing shirking. This type of peer monitoring has been defined by balanced monitoring. The third part analyzes the relationship betweendifferent peer monitoring and team incentive based on dynamic game. Four game models are established： model of incentive dynamic consistency without peermonitoring, the game model of incentive dynamic inconsistency without peer monitoring, the game model of incentive dynamic consistency with peermonitoring, and the game model of incentive dynamic inconsistency with peer monitoring. The optimal

关 键 词：横向监督 动态博弈 团队激励 棘轮效应 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]