经理人薪酬结构激励效应文献综述  

A Review of Managers' Compensation Structure Incentive Effects

作　　者：吴玉婷[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学旅游学院,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《上海金融学院学报》2016年第6期108-116,共9页Journal of Shanhai Finance University

基　　金：华侨大学研究生创新基金;中国旅游研究院(研究生)优奖计划专项基金资助课题

摘　　要：企业所有权和经营权分离所带来的代理问题是企业治理领域的核心问题,长久以来,与企业绩效挂钩的经理人薪酬激励机制设计被认为是有效解决代理问题的关键。对于企业经理人来说,薪酬结构发挥着比薪酬水平更显著的激励作用。经理人薪酬可分为显性薪酬和隐性薪酬,本文在系统梳理薪酬结构激励效应文献的基础上,总结了显性薪酬激励、隐性薪酬激励对企业绩效的影响,以期为我国的理论和实务提供有益借鉴。The Agency Problem brought by the separation of ownership and managerial authority is a core issue in the field of corporate governance. For a long time, enterprise performance of managers＇ salary incentive mechanism design is considered to be the key to solve the problem. For managers, compensation structure plays a more significant role than the compensation level. It can be divided into explicit compensation and implicit compensation. Based on the reviews of the literature, the author summarized the explicit compensation and implicit compensation impact on corporate performance so as to provide some useful reference for the theory and practice in China.

关 键 词：薪酬结构 显性薪酬 隐性薪酬 激励效应 

分 类 号：F275.4[经济管理—企业管理]