绩效考核和薪酬激励问题的演化博弈分析  

Analysis of performance assessment and incentive compensation based on evolutionary game theory

作　　者：黄国辉[1] 孙剑平[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210094

出　　处：《山西经济管理干部学院学报》2017年第2期5-8,共4页Journal of Shanxi Institute of Economic Management

摘　　要：基于演化博弈理论研究了绩效考核和薪酬激励对企业员工行为选择的影响。企业采取不同的绩效考核和薪酬激励策略,员工会有不同的行为选择,可描述为2x2博弈问题。建立了收益矩阵和复制者动态方程,对博弈模型的演化稳定策略进行了论述。在合理假设条件下,通过分析博弈模型参数与演化稳定策略的关系,提出了管理建议。最终结果表明,企业会进行绩效考核和薪酬激励而员工会积极工作。Effects of performance assessment and incentive compensation on enterprise employees＇ behavior choice are investigated based on evolutionary game theory. Different performance assessment and incentive compen- sation strategies of enterprises lead to different behavior choice of employees, and the problem can be described as a 2 x 2 game. Pay off matrix and replicator dynamics equations are constructed and evolutionary stable strategy of game model is addressed. By exploring the relationship of game model parameters and evolutionary stable strategy （ESS）, management advice is offered under reasonable hypothesis. Final results suggest that enterprise will choose the strategy of performance assessment and incentive compensation and employees will work actively.

关 键 词：绩效考核 薪酬激励 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：C962[经济管理—人力资源管理]