国企高管政治晋升与公司现金持有:寻租还是效率  

Political Promotion and Cash Holding in SOEs:Rent-seeking or Efficiency?

作　　者：钱爱民[1] 张晨宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100029

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2017年第5期42-51,共10页Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"金融生态;企业财务质量与资本配置效率"(71272041);国家自然科学基金青年项目"企业社会责任报告晕轮效应研究--基于业绩预告感知可信度的视角"(71602004);国家留学基金项目(201606640075)

摘　　要：本文以2007~2015年的国有控股上市公司为研究对象,考察了国企高管政治晋升对公司现金持有行为的影响。研究发现,国企高管政治晋升时,公司现金持有量显著增加,现金持有价值显著降低,体现了现金持有的代理动机。进一步研究发现,有效的内外部治理机制(管理层持股、两职分离、产品市场竞争、投资者保护)能够约束政治晋升高管的私人收益行为,降低现金持有的代理动机。本文的研究表明,政治晋升使国企高管利用企业资源获取私人收益,增加了股东与管理层之间的代理冲突,该研究结论对深化国企改革、完善经理人市场具有重要的启示。This paper examines the effect of political promotion on agency problems in SOEs from the perspective of cash holdings.We find that there is a significantly positive relationship between political promotion and cash holdings,the higher the political promotion,the more the cash holdings,but the lower the value of cash holdings.The finding shows that the cash holdings in political promotion firms reflect the agency problem and managers are more likely to reserve more cash to pursue private benefits.However,the effective internal and external governance mechanisms(such as ownership,low power,product market competition and investor protection)can mitigate agency problem of cash holdings in political promotion firms.Overall,political promotion executives use firms' resources to pursue private benefits,and exacerbate agency conflicts between shareholders and managers.The finding has an important policy suggestion for the SOE reform and job market building.

关 键 词：政治晋升 现金持有 国企改革 自由现金流假说 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理]