股权制衡、政治关联对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响——基于创业板上市公司OLS分析  

Effect of Equity Balance and Political Connection on Compensation-performance Sensitivity:OLS Analysis of Listed Corporations in GEM

作　　者：修浩鑫 张炳发[1] 张文静 XIU Hao-xin ZHANG Bing-fa ZHANG Wen-jing(University of Jinan, Jinan, Shandong, 250002,Chin)

机构地区：[1]济南大学,山东济南250002

出　　处：《武汉商学院学报》2018年第1期80-84,共5页Journal of Wuhan Business University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目<企业知识资本投资行为异化及其治理研究>(项目编号:13BGL0282172);教育部人文社科项目<幸福老龄化导向下的社会保障与代际转移联动机制研究>(项目编号:17YJAZH054);山东省自然科学基金项目<基于新政府会计体系的地方政府内部控制创新与转型研究>(项目编号:ZR2017MG016)

摘　　要：高管薪酬业绩敏感性作为衡量薪酬契约的重要途径,可以减缓代理冲突。基于此,选取2012-2015年创业板上市公司作为样本,探讨股权制衡、政治关联对薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。结论表明:股权制衡可以显著地提高薪酬业绩敏感性,政治关联对薪酬业绩敏感性具有促进作用;深入分析发现,在具有政治关联的企业中,股权制衡可以更加显著地提升薪酬业绩敏感性;研究结果为企业加强股权制衡、构建政治关联,提高薪酬业绩敏感性提供了一定依据与参考。The sensitivity of compensation-performance for senior executives,as an important means to assess the salary contract,can mitigate the agency conflict.Starting from this point,the paper studies how equity balance and political connection affect the sensitivity of compensation-performance with the sample data of the listed corporations during the period of 2012-2015 in Growth Enterprises Market Board（GEM）.The results have the following indications：equity balance can significantly promote the compensation-performance sensitivity; political connection has some positive effect on compensation-performance sensitivity.The further study reveals that in enterprises with political connection,equity balance can more significantly promote compensation-performance sensitivity.The study can provide some reference to issues as improving equity balance,political connection and increasing compensation-performance.

关 键 词：股权制衡 政治关联 高管薪酬 业绩敏感性 创业板上市公司 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]