基于微分博弈的食品供应链溯源信息共享行为协调机制研究  

Study on Coordination Mechanism of Traceable Information Sharing Behavior in Food Supply Chain Based on Differential Game

作　　者：宋焕[1] 王瑞梅[1] 马威[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国农业大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《华中农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2018年第3期144-151,共8页Journal of Huazhong Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家"十二五"科技支撑计划课题项目"村镇服务业与相关产业协同发展关键技术研究"(2014BAL07B05);国家社会科学基金项目"农户环境行为对农业面源污染的影响及防控策略研究"(16AJY013);教育部人文社会科学项目"食品可追溯体系中参与主体的行为特征及其影响因素研究"(13YJCZH182)

摘　　要：运用微分博弈的方法,构建追溯食品生产商和追溯食品加工商的博弈模型,研究3种不同决策模式下二者溯源信息共享的最优策略、收益及食品供应链总收益的变化情况,并利用Matlab对模型进行仿真模拟分析。结果表明:集中决策时食品供应链的总收益最大;成本分担契约可以实现追溯食品生产商和食品供应链收益的帕累托改进;溯源食品品牌形象及溯源信息共享成本的影响系数对追溯食品生产商和追溯食品加工商的溯源信息共享行为产生影响。Based on differential game,this paper constructs the game model of traceable food manufacturers and traceable food processors and studies the optimal traceable information sharing strategy of traceable food manufacturers and traceable food processors,revenue and the total revenue of the entire food supply chain under three different decision-making conditions.Then simulation model is analyzed with the help of Matlab in this paper.The result shows that the total revenues of the entire food supply chain are the largest when making centralized decision.Making cost sharing can achieve a Pareto improvement for the traceable food manufacturers and the total revenue of the entire food supply chain.The influencing coefficient of brand image and traceable information sharing cost have the impact on both traceable food manufacturers and traceable food processors.

关 键 词：食品供应链 可追溯体系 溯源信息共享 微分博弈 食品安全 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]