独立董事薪酬与公司治理效率  

Compensation of Independent Directors and the Effectiveness of Corporate Governance

作　　者：张天舒[1] 陈信元[2] 黄俊[2] ZHANG Tianshu;CHEN Xinyuan;HUANG Jun(School of Accountancy, Shanghai University of International Business and Economic;Institute of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economic)

机构地区：[1]上海对外经贸大学会计学院,上海201620 [2]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院,上海200433

出　　处：《金融研究》2018年第6期155-170,共16页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71372038;71632006);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大研究项目(16JJD790037);上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2017BGL009);上海财经大学创新团队支持计划的资助

摘　　要：利用2003~2013年上市公司数据,本文基于独立董事薪酬视角对其治理效用的发挥进行了考察。研究发现,当独立董事的薪酬过低时,存在激励不足问题,不利于调动独立董事履职的积极性,由此造成公司高管变更与经营业绩间敏感性的降低及公司盈余管理程度的提高。与此相仿,当独立董事的薪酬过高时,存在激励过度问题,削弱了独立董事的独立性,也将导致较低的高管变更与经营业绩的敏感性及更高程度的公司盈余管理。最后,我们对独立董事薪酬影响其治理效用发挥的路径进行了考察,结果显示,过低的薪酬降低了独立董事参加董事会会议的意愿,而过高的薪酬造成独立董事更不会对董事会议案提出异议。Usinging the data of listed companies from 2003 to 2013, this paper investigates the effect of the compensation of independent directors on corporate governance. When the compensation of independent directors is too low, the underpayment problem decreases the incentive of directors to fulfill their responsibilities, leading to a lower sensitivity of manager turnover and firm performance and a higher level of earnings management. Moreover, when the compensation of independent directors is too high, the overpayment problem reduces the independence of independent directors, also resulting in a lower sensitivity of manager turnover and firm performance and a higher level of earnings management. Finally, we investigate the influencing mechanism of the compensation of independent directors. We find that underpayment decreases the incentive of independent directors to attend board meetings and overpayment makes independent directors less likely dissent the proposals of board meetings.

关 键 词：薪酬激励 高管更换 盈余管理 独立董事 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济]