重审早期康德最初引入“道德情感”的内在理由——以1762年“获奖论文”为核心  

Reexamination of the Intrinsic Reasons for the Early Introduction of “Moral Emotions” by Kant:Focusing on Prize Essay of 1762

作　　者：朱毅[1] 梁乐睿 ZHU Yi;LIANG Le-rui(Department of Philosophy,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院,上海200433

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2018年第5期78-85,共8页Journal of Shanghai Jiao tong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(12&ZD122);2017年国家留学基金委资助(201706100035)

摘　　要：通过对康德1762年"获奖论文"展开的文本分析与历史考察,文章重新审视康德在早期伦理思想发展中最初引入"道德情感"的内在理由:使他一开始倾向情感主义的根本原因,源自沃尔夫理性主义伦理学在界定道德责任初始根据上存在的理论缺失。康德在哈奇森道德情感论的影响下,试图引入"道德情感"概念来阐明人类道德意识的来源以及道德判断的可能性,借此弥补沃尔夫"完善性"原则之空洞性带来的困难。虽然从他批判时期的成熟观点看,这种类似"折衷主义"的理论尝试最终并不成功,但却在相当程度上预示了康德伦理思想未来发展的基本走向。Through the textual analysis and historical investigation of Kant＇s＂Prize Essay＂of 1762,this paper re-examines the intrinsic reason for the first introduction of the concept of＂moral feeling＂in the development of Kant＇s early ethics：Because of the deficiency of Wolff＇s rational ethics,which fails to define the initial basis of moral responsibility,Kant first tends to the Sentiments.Under the influence of Moral Sentiment like Hutcheson,Kant attempts to introduce the concept of＂moral feeling＂to elucidate the origin and moral judgment of human moral consciousness so as to make up for the difficulties caused by＂perfectness＂principle which belongs to Wolff.Judging from the mature perspective of the critical period of Kant,this kind of＂eclecticism＂attempt is unsuccessful,but it largely foreshadows the general trend of Kant＇s ethical thought in the future.

关 键 词：康德 获奖论文 完善性 道德情感 内在理由 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学]