论西季威克对“应当”的界定  

On Sidgwick's Definition of “Ought”

作　　者：余建滨[1] YU Jianbin(Department of Philosophy,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)

机构地区：[1]北京大学哲学系,北京100871

出　　处：《宜宾学院学报》2018年第2期37-43,共7页Journal of Yibin University

摘　　要：对"应当"概念的界定是伦理学中最基本的工作之一。在《伦理学方法》第一卷第三章中,西季威克通过对常识的反思以及对两种自然主义伦理观点的反驳,否定了把"应当"还原为一种欲望的作用的观点,而认为该概念在根本上表达了一种理性的要求和命令,并认为这是一个不可被进一步还原分解的简单概念,只能凭直觉把握。西季威克对"应当"概念的这一理解具有一种义务论的特征,使他在根本上区别于边沁、密尔等功利主义思想家。而通过西季威克对密尔的功利主义证明的反驳我们看到,这种义务论特征实际上是西季威克为证明功利主义理论的必然选择。Defining the notion of“ought”is one of the basic issues in ethics.Through an examination of one’s intuition and two kinds of naturalistic theories,Sidgwick refutes the view that reduces the effects of“ought”into the pull of desire in chapter three of volume one in The Methods of Ethics.Instead,Sidgwick holds that the notion of“ought”is primarily used to expressed the command of reason,which is essentially different from any kind of desires and can only be grasped by one’s intuition.However,this definition of“ought”makes Sidgwick more of a deontologist,which is radically different from Bentham’s and Mill’s utilitarianisms.The feature of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism comes from his recognition of the failure of Mill’s proof of utilitarianism,and deontology is important for Sidgwick’s proof of utilitarianism.

关 键 词：应当 欲望 理性命令 目的论 义务论 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]