供应链上游食品质量检测的信号博弈策略  

Signal Game Strategy of Food Quality Inspection in Upstream of Supply Chain

作　　者：童毛弟[1] 宋祺楠 陈莹[2] TONG Maodi;SONG Qi′nan;CHEN Ying(School of Economics&Management,Nanjing Tech University,Nanjing 211816,China;School of Management&Engineering,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China)

机构地区：[1]南京工业大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211816 [2]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《南京工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2018年第4期81-87,共7页Journal of Nanjing Tech University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：江苏省高校哲学社会科学重点项目"基于大数据挖掘的江苏省食品安全监管指数研究"(2017ZDIXM074);江苏高校哲学社会科学优秀创新团队"中国食品安全监管指数及评价研究"(2017ZSTD005)

摘　　要：运用信号博弈方法,通过构建食品供应链供求企业的信号博弈模型,研究由原材料供应商和食品加工商组成的两级食品供应链质量检测选择的策略及其影响因素,结果表明:其一,当伪装成本过高时,不同类型的原材料供应商制定不同的批发价可以作为传递自己供应高低质量原材料的信号;食品加工商在供应商选择高批发价时不进行质检,在供应商选择低批发价时选择质检。其二,当伪装成本较低时,批发价作为信号传递作用将减弱以至不存在;原材料供应商选择高批发价,食品加工商则根据惩罚成本是否大于检测成功成本而选择质检或不质检。In this paper,the signal game model of supply and demand enterprises is used to study the strategy and influencing factors of quality testing and selection of two-level food supply chain composed of raw material suppliers and food processors.The results show that:Firstly,When the disguised cost is too high,different wholesale prices set by different types of food suppliers can be used as a signal to deliver the quality of raw materials.Food processors choose not to make quality inspection when suppliers select a high wholesale price,while choosing to do it when suppliers select a low wholesale price.Secondly,When the disguised cost is low,the wholesale price will be weakened as a signal transmission.Food suppliers choose high wholesale prices,and food processors will make their decision whether to do the inspection according to whether the cost of punishment is greater than the cost of successful testing.

关 键 词：食品供应链 食品安全风险 信号博弈 伪装成本 

分 类 号：F203[经济管理—国民经济] TS201.64[轻工技术与工程—食品科学]