高管权力、内部控制、高管薪酬与企业绩效——一种有中介的调节作用模型  

Executive Power,Internal Control and Executive Compensation:An Intermediary Regulation Model

作　　者：元继学[1] 王建军 朱晓红[1] YUAN Ji-xue;WANG Jian-jun;ZHU Xiao-hong(School of Administration,Qilu University of Technology(Shangdong Academy of Science),Jinan 250353,China)

机构地区：[1]齐鲁工业大学(山东省科学院)管理学院,济南250353

出　　处：《齐鲁工业大学学报》2018年第5期73-80,共8页Journal of Qilu University of Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71702083)

摘　　要：以沪深两市2007—2017年A股上市公司为研究样本,探究了高管权力、内部控制、高管薪酬和企业绩效四者关系的传导机制。研究发现:内部控制质量越高,高管权力对企业绩效的负相关性越显著;内部控制质量越低,高管权力与高管薪酬正相关性越显著;高管权力与内部控制的交互作用与企业绩效显著正相关;高管薪酬在高管权力与内部控制的交互作用对企业绩效显著正向影响中起到中介传导作用。By taking the 2007-2017A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as a research sample,this study explores the transmission mechanism of the relationship between executive power,internal control,executive compensation and corporate performance,and has the following findings:1)the higher the quality of internal control,the more significant the negative correlation between executive power and firm performance;2)the lower the quality of internal control,the more positive the correlation between executive power and executive compensation;3)the interaction between executive power and internal control significantly positively correlated with corporate performance;4)executive compensation plays an intermediary role in the significant positive impact of the interaction between executive power and internal control on firm performance.

关 键 词：高管权力 内部控制 高管薪酬 有中介的调节 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]