劳资冲突行为演化的随机突变分析及稳定性  

Random Catastrophe Analysis of Evolution of Labor Disputes Behavior and Stability

作　　者：姜凤珍[1,2,3] 胡斌 JIANG Fengzhen;HU Bin(School of Management,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430074,China;Scool of Management Engineering,Qingdao University of Technology,Qingdao 266520,Shandong,China;Reservoir Immigration Research Center,Three Gorgest University,Yichang 443002,Hubei,China)

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074 [2]青岛理工大学管理工程学院,山东青岛266520 [3]三峡大学水库移民研究中心,湖北宜昌443002

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2019年第5期991-997,共7页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271093);湖北省普通高校人文社会科学重点研究基地—水库移民研究中心开放基金课题资助项目(2018KF01)

摘　　要：针对员工群体与组织之间在利益分配过程中冲突行为的演化过程,借助演化博弈理论建立复制动态方程,同时结合突变理论将复制动态方程转化为经典的尖点突变模型,运用突变理论分析员工层面与组织劳资冲突行为的演化过程。在此基础上,在尖点突变模型中加入随机扰动项,解释员工层面与组织在受到随机扰动的情况下对抗行为的演化,并给出对抗事件演化的稳定性分析。最后,给出模型的数值模拟分析。模拟结果表明:员工的边际生产率越高,员工群体层面爆发冲突行为发生突变的可能性越高,员工的边际生产率越低,冲突行为越趋于稳定;员工的努力成本越低,在员工发生对抗事件过程中组织采取强硬措施的可能性越高;对抗事件对员工层面造成的损失越大,冲突事件发生突变的可能性越小。Aiming at the evolution of the conflict behavior between the employee groups and the organization in the process of the distribution of benefits , a replicated dynamic equation was establish by using the evolutionary game theory.At the same time , combining the catastrophe theory , the replicated dynamic equation was transformed into a classical cusp catastrophic model , and the catastrophe theory was used to analyze the evolutionary process of labor dispute behavior between employees and organization.Besides , in the cusp catastrophic model , a random disturbance term was added to explain the evolution of aggressive behavior , and the stability analysis was made between employees and organization under the condition of random disturbance.In addition , the numerical simulation analysis of the model was given.The simulation results show that as the marginal productivity of employees increases , the possibility of sudden change of conflict behavior increases , while as the marginal productivity of employees decreases , the possibility of sudden change of conflict behavior tends to be stable.As the cost of efforts of the employees decreases , it is more likely for the organization to take tough measures in the process of conflict , while as the loss caused by the conflict to the employees increases , it is less likely for the conflict to mutate.

关 键 词：劳资冲突 演化博弈理论 突变理论 随机扰动 

分 类 号：F936[经济管理]