柏拉图德性论中的“情感”(pathos)概念  

The Conception of Pathos in Plato's Theory of Arete

作　　者：李静含 LI Jing-han(School of Philosophy and Social Development,Shandong University, Jinan Shandong 251000, China)

机构地区：[1]山东大学哲学与社会发展学院,山东济南251000

出　　处：《内蒙古社会科学》2020年第2期55-61,共7页Inner Mongolia Social Sciences

摘　　要：在柏拉图对话关于德性问题的论述中,我们通常的印象是文中对“情感”和感性经验持排斥态度。早期的苏格拉底式德性论拒绝“情感”这种非理性因素参与到道德行为和认识中,虽然之后柏拉图修正了这种唯理智主义倾向,但中期对话的德性论仍以对情感的批评为主流。柏拉图对于“情感”因素有着矛盾的态度,这种矛盾扎根于他思想中理念世界与经验现实的对立中。柏拉图在后期对话中讨论了如何使经验的事物符合理念理性,德性论的新思路转变为如何规范情感和感性经验,并将“情感教育”作为道德教育的核心。In the Plato's dialogues on the issue of virtue,our usual impression is that the text is critical to affection and perceptual experience.The early Socratic virtue theory rejects the irrational factors of affection and its participating in moral behavior and understanding.Although Plato corrects this rationalist tendency,the virtue theory of the medium-term dialogues still mainly show its criticism on affection.Plato has a contradictory attitude towards the affection factor,which is rooted in the opposition between the ideal being and the empirical reality in his thoughts.In the later dialogues,Plato discusses how to make the world of experience conform to the rationality of ideas.The new ideas of virtue theory are transformed into how to regulate affectional and perceptual experiences and make affectional education the core of moral education.

关 键 词：柏拉图 德性 经验 情感 

分 类 号：B502.232[哲学宗教—外国哲学]