“道德价值”与“道德运气”  

Moral Value and Moral Luck

作　　者：马寅卯[1] Ma Yinmao

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院哲学研究所

出　　处：《哲学研究》2020年第4期100-111,125,共13页Philosophical Research

摘　　要：“道德价值”是康德伦理学的核心概念,“道德运气”论者试图通过对康德道德价值概念的批评从根本上瓦解康德的伦理学。本文试图表明康德的“道德价值”概念具有多重意蕴,它不仅关乎动机和准则,也关乎努力、付出和道德勇气;“道德运气”问题不构成对康德道德哲学的根本挑战,康德的道德哲学是可以容纳“道德运气”并内在地回应其挑战的;康德伦理学与“道德运气”论尽管存在着诸多根本差异,但都具有各自的价值,并且二者存在融合的可能性。Moral value,as one of the core concepts of Kant's ethics,is vigorously attacked by advocates of moral luck theory,who try to fundamentally deny Kant's ethics by criticizing this concept.This article attempts to show that Kant's concept of“moral value”has multiple implications including not only motivation and norms,but also effort,dedication and moral courage.Moral luck does not constitute a fundamental challenge to Kant's ethics.Kant's ethics is compatible with moral luck and responds to its challenges internally.In spite of many differences between Kant's ethics and moral luck theory,both sides have their own significance,and there is a possibility of merging them together.

关 键 词：道德价值 道德运气 控制 意志 义务 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]