国企改革背景下的企业创新和相对绩效评价——基于中国上市国有企业的实证研究  

Corporate Innovation and Relative Performance Evaluation in Context of SOE Reform

作　　者：刘晓婷 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《中国注册会计师》2020年第4期50-54,I0001,共5页The Chinese Certified Public Accountant

摘　　要："创新驱动战略"和"激励约束机制"成为本轮国企改革的关键词。基于此背景,本文选取2008-2018年中国上市国有企业数据,探究了企业创新和相对绩效评价(RPE)之间的关系,得到两个结论:第一,得益于我国薪酬制度改革的不断深入,RPE在上市国有企业的薪酬合同中得到广泛应用;第二,由于创新投入对企业绩效有滞后效应,当企业增加研发投入时,企业高管可能会出于自利动机而减少RPE的使用。对此,本文从政府和企业两方面提出了解决建议。"Innovation-driven strategy" and "incentive and restraint mechanism" have become the key words in the new round of reform of the state-owned enterprises(SOE). In this background,this article selectsthe data oflisted SOEs in Chinafrom 2008 to 2018 and investigates the relationshipbetween corporate innovation and relative performance evaluation(RPE). Finally, it drawstwo conclusions. First, due to the continuous progress of the reform of the compensation system in China,RPE has been widely adoptedin the compensation contracts of listed SOEs;second,because of the hysteresis effect of innovation investments on corporate performance,when companies increase investments in research and development activities, the executives may try not to use the RPE for their own interest. Therefore, this article puts forward relevant suggestions from the perspectives of both the government and the companies.

关 键 词：国企改革 企业创新 高管薪酬 相对绩效评价 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济] F273.1F272.5