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作 者:马智颖 孙世敏[1] 张汉南[1] MA Zhiying;SUN Shimin;ZHANG Hannan(School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169, China)
出 处:《东北大学学报(社会科学版)》2021年第1期43-51,共9页Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)
基 金:国家社会科学基金资助项目(17BGL244)。
摘 要:基于行为经济学视角分析了高管过度在职消费成因,并以中国沪深A股上市公司2012—2017年数据为样本,实证检验了薪酬外部公平性对高管过度在职消费行为后果的影响以及内部薪酬差距的调节作用。研究发现:薪酬外部劣势不公平会诱发高管过度在职消费,并削弱在职消费“效率观”表现,而内部薪酬差距可以抑制上述影响。在薪酬外部优势不公平状态下,优势不公平程度对高管过度在职消费和在职消费经济效应无显著影响,内部薪酬差距反会诱发高管过度在职消费,削弱在职消费“效率观”表现。From the perspective of behavioral economics,this paper analyzes the causes of executives'excessive perks,and empirically tests the impact of external fairness of compensation on the consequences of executives'excessive perks as well as the moderating role of internal pay gap by using the data of China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in 2012-2017 as a sample.The study finds that the unfairness of external disadvantages of compensation will induce executives'excessive perks and weaken the“efficiency effect”of perks,while the internal pay gap can restrain such effects.In the case of the unfair external advantage of compensation,the unfairness degree has no significant effect on executives'excessive perks or the“efficiency effect”of perks.The internal pay gap will instead induce executives'excessive perks and weaken the“efficiency effect”of perks.
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