银行关联、区域金融发展与高管薪酬  

Banking Connection,Regional Financial Development and Executive Compensation

作　　者：陈继萍[1] 崔浩杰 王帅 Chen Jiping;Cui Haojie;Wang Shuai(Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics,Urumqi 830012,China;Panjin Branch of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China,Panjin 124010,China)

机构地区：[1]新疆财经大学会计学院,新疆乌鲁木齐830012 [2]中国工商银行盘锦分行,辽宁盘锦124010

出　　处：《新疆财经》2021年第2期29-39,共11页Finance & Economics of Xinjiang

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“小股东治理与公司代理问题——基于股吧悲观情绪的研究”(71962032)。

摘　　要：本文以2012年—2019年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,探讨银行关联与高管薪酬之间的关系。研究发现:银行关联能够提升企业高管薪酬水平,且在高层级银行关联企业中更为显著;区域金融发展会在银行关联对高管薪酬的作用上产生影响,在金融发展水平低的地区,企业引入高层级银行关联高管后会显著提高高管薪酬水平。进一步探究其作用机制发现,缓解融资约束对提高高管薪酬具有显著的间接效应。本文从银行关联这一非正式制度视角探究了影响高管薪酬的因素,为高管薪酬契约的设计提供了经验证据。By using A-share listed enterprises during 2012-2019 in China,this paper empirically studies relationship between banking connection and executive compensation.The study has found that banking connection could improve the level of executive compensation,and it is more significant in higher-hierarchy banking connected enterprises.It also finds that the level of regional financial development will affect the role of banking connection in executive compensation pricing.Executive compensation will be improved more significantly after building higher-hierarchy banking connection in areas of lower financial development level.Further research its mechanism,the paper finds that alleviating financing constraints has a significant indirect effect on improving executive compensation.This paper explores the factors influencing executive compensation from the perspective of informal institution of bank association,which provides empirical evidence for the design of executive compensation contracts.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 银行关联 关联层级 区域金融发展 融资约束 薪酬契约 

分 类 号：F275.3[经济管理—企业管理] F272.93[经济管理—国民经济]