苏格拉底论德性即知识  

Socrates on Virtue as Knowledge

作　　者：田书峰 TIAN Shu-feng(Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou 510275,China)

机构地区：[1]中山大学哲学系,广州510275

出　　处：《云南大学学报（社会科学版）》2021年第3期5-18,共14页The Journal of Yunnan University:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“希腊罗马伦理学综合研究”(项目号:13&ZD065)的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：学者们普遍认为,苏格拉底伦理学是理智主义伦理学,其中一个核心命题就是:德性就是知识,或至少在本质上是由知识构成的,因此,每一个别的德性都是对其所关涉的对象主题的一种理智认知上的把握,人的行动动机也是理智主义的,因为行动者在行动时相信这对自己是最好的,这表示,任何一种伦理上的失败都是基于或者至少部分地基于行动者对什么是对自己最好的选择的错误信念或认知。本文的旨趣并不是对苏格拉底的这种理智主义进行辩护或批判,而是更多地通过早期对话中有关德性即知识的段落分析去理解苏格拉底所说的德性即知识的丰富内涵,通过Euthyphro,Charmides,Laches,Protagoras这四篇对话来探寻苏格拉底所说的德性即知识的内在涵义。The scholars usually hold that the Socratic ethic is substantially an intellectualistic ethic.One of its central claims is that virtue is knowledge or at least constituted fundamentally by knowledge.Therefore,every particular virtue can be characterized as a kind of intellectual grasp of its specific subject-matter,and human motivation is also intellectualistic because the actor believes what he chooses to do is what is the best for him to do at the moment of action.This means that every moral failure also signifies a kind of wrong belief about what is the best for him to do.This article does not aim to defense the Socratic intellectualism or to exert critique,but tries to reveal the rich implications of the Socratic doctrine through analyzing the central passages in the Platonic early dialogues,especially Euthyphro,Charmides,Laches and Protagoras.

关 键 词：理智主义 德性即知识 节制 虔敬 勇敢 

分 类 号：B502[哲学宗教—外国哲学]