拒绝随附性——非自然主义道德实在论的新选择  

Denying Supervenience——The New Choice of Non-naturalistic Moral Realism

作　　者：马豪 王保国[1] MA Hao;WANG Bao-guo(Yanbian University,Yanbian 133002,China)

机构地区：[1]延边大学人文社会科学学院,吉林延吉133002

出　　处：《哈尔滨学院学报》2021年第6期15-19,共5页Journal of Harbin University

摘　　要：当代一些学者认为,如果两个事物或两种行为在自然属性上完全相同,那么它们的道德属性也完全相同。在元伦理学领域,一般使用“随附性”(Supervenience)这一术语来形容这种关系:即道德属性随附(Supervene)于非道德属性。如何解释这样的随附性关系给非自然主义道德实在论带来了巨大挑战。为了应对这一挑战,阿里森·希尔斯认为,非自然主义道德实在论者可以合理的拒绝随附性关系的存在,转而论证道德属性与自然属性之间的关系其实是一种经常性连接(constant conjunction)。文章在对阿里森·希尔斯主要观点及论证梳理的基础上,对其论证合理性进行了分析。Some contemporary scholars believe that if two things or two behaviors are identical in natural properties,then their moral properties are also identical.In the field of meta ethics,the term“supervenience”is generally used to describe this relationship,that is,moral properties are attached to non-moral properties.How to explain this kind of attached relationship has brought great challenge to the non-naturalistic moral realism.In order to deal with this challenge,Alison Hills believes that non-naturalist moral realists can reasonably refuse the existence of the adjunctive relationship,and instead demonstrate that the relationship between moral properties and natural properties is actually a constant connection.This paper analyzes the rationality of Alison Hills’argumentation on the basis of sorting out his main viewpoints and argumentation.

关 键 词：随附性 非自然主义道德实在论 元伦理学 

分 类 号：B82-066[哲学宗教—伦理学]