供应商“强制性策略”的概念测量与作用机制:基于汽车行业的实证研究  

Concept Measurement and Influence Mechanism of Supplier’s Coercive Strategy An Empirical Research on Automobile Industry

作　　者：纪雪洪[1] 杨一翁[1] Ji Xuehong;Yang Yiweng(School of Economics and Management,North China University of Technology,Beijing 100144)

机构地区：[1]北方工业大学经济管理学院,北京100144

出　　处：《管理评论》2021年第6期306-315,共10页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71802005);北京市社会科学基金一般项目(16GLC009),北京市社会科学基金青年项目(17GLC068)。

摘　　要：本文以汽车行业为例,探讨供应商与经销商发生渠道冲突以及它们关系持续恶化的主要原因,提出一个整合供应商目标、经销商目标、供应商"强制性策略"以及经销商满意度之间关系的理论模型。实证研究结果表明,汽车厂家实施"强制性策略"的主要原因在于"强制性策略"显著地正向影响供应商销售目标的实现,然而"强制性策略"对经销商经济绩效和经销商满意度均有显著的负向影响。供应商"强制性策略"是造成渠道冲突的主要原因。本文提出解决渠道冲突的主要途径是供应商转变其渠道策略,从以"强制性策略"为主转变为以"非强制性策略"为主,这需要供应商降低其对短期利益的追求,并从长远角度维护其与经销商的共同利益。Taking automobile industry as an example,this paper discusses the main reasons for the channel conflicts between suppliers and dealers,as well as the continued deterioration of their relationships. A theoretical model is developed to integrate the relationships among suppliers’ goal,dealers’ goal,coercive strategy and dealers’ satisfaction. The empirical research results show that the main reason why automobile suppliers implement coercive strategies is that coercive strategies positively affect the realization of suppliers’ sales goals. While coercive strategies have significant negative impacts on both dealers’ economic performances and their satisfaction. Coercive strategy is the major cause of channel conflicts. This paper puts forward an approach to solving channel conflicts,namely,suppliers change their channel strategies from focusing on coercive strategies to focusing on non-coercive strategies,which makes it necessary for suppliers to reduce their pursuits of short-term benefits and maintain the common interests of both suppliers and dealers from long-term perspective.

关 键 词：渠道冲突 “强制性策略” 经销商满意度 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F426.471[经济管理—国民经济]