一致行动人与高管薪酬差距:监督还是激励  

People Acting-In-Concert and Managerial Pay Gap:Monitoring or Incentive?

作　　者：章琳一[1] 张洪辉[1] ZHANG Lin-yi;ZHANG Hong-hui(School of Accounting,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang,Jiangxi,330013,China)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《经济管理》2021年第8期91-106,共16页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“抱团取暖:中小股东签订一致行动人协议的动因与影响研究”(72002086);教育部人文社会科学项目“高质量审计、晋升锦标赛与机会主义行为”(18YJC790227);教育部人文社会科学项目“内部控制优势富集效应、晋升锦标赛与企业社会责任研究”(19YJC790182)。

摘　　要：随着股权分散化时代的到来,上市公司的非关联关系股东之间签订一致行动人协议结盟的事件屡见不鲜。这种结盟行为对公司影响如何是值得研究的问题,然而少有文献关注该问题。本文分析了一致行动人与高管薪酬差距的关系,发现结盟构成控股股东的一致行动人能够抑制高管薪酬差距;没有构成控股股东的一致行动人则促进高管薪酬差距。对于二者关系的理论解释,本文发现,一致行动人主要发挥着监督作用,能够抑制CEO代理行为,而其激励作用有限。在影响路径上,本文发现,一致行动人会影响CEO权力,进而影响高管薪酬差距。在横截面上,本文发现,高质量审计能够替代一致行动人的监督作用,抑制高管薪酬差距;一致行动人抑制高管薪酬差距的监督作用,在代理问题严重的公司更为显著。在稳健性检验上,本文排除了晋升锦标赛解释、采用反事实推断方法、更换被解释变量、考虑反向因果、采用倾向值匹配和引入外生事件方法,确保了结果稳健性。本研究扩展了关于一致行动人问题研究视角,丰富了高管薪酬差距的相关文献,为后续研究起到"抛砖引玉"的作用。With the advent of the era of equity diversification,it is common for unaffiliated shareholders of listed companies to sign agreements with people acting in concert.Why do unaffiliated shareholders of listed companies sign this agreement and what is the influence of people acting in concert?According to our statistics,there are lots of controlling shareholders forming through signing the agreement of people acting in concert.Therefore,there are two categories about people acting in concert:controlling shareholders formed by people acting in concert,minority shareholders formed by people acting in concert.The extant literature on shareholders posit that controlling shareholders can be a good monitoring mechanism,to restrain the agency behavior of managers.As to the pay gap,there are two explanation.One is the managerial power,which can affect the compensation,reflecting the agency problem between managers and shareholders.The other is the incentive from shareholders,who want to motivate the managers to work hard,by enlarging the pay gap between different levels and forming a tournament contest.Since the shareholders can affect the pay gap between different levels of managers,what would the pay gap be when shareholders acted in concert?It is an interesting question worth studying.And analyzing the effect of shareholders acted in concert on the pay gap of the management is helpful for us to understanding the emerging phenomenon in China’s capital market.Based on the data of China,this article analyzes the impact of people acting in concert on the pay gap of executives and finds that the people acting in concert that constitute the controlling shareholder can play a supervisory role and suppress the executive pay gap;the people acting in concert that do not constitute the controlling shareholder cannot curb the executive pay gap.This result shows that different types of concerted actors have different effects on the managerial pay gap.Regarding the channel,this article finds that people acting in concert will affec

关 键 词：一致行动人 高管 薪酬差距 监督 激励 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]