在分别幸福境界中由“善”达及“存在”——亚里士多德《尼各马可伦理学》之幸福论及其思想启示  被引量:2

From "Goodness" to "Existence" In the Realm of Separate Happiness,——The happiness theory of Aristotle’sNicomachean Ethicsand his ideological enlightenment

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作  者:刘素民[1] Liu Sumin(Institute of Philosophy,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Bejing 100102,China)

机构地区:[1]中国社会科学院哲学研究所,北京100102

出  处:《学术交流》2021年第11期5-17,191,共14页Academic Exchange

摘  要:亚里士多德认为德性是灵魂的实现活动的卓越表现,是人对其理性功能的履行——人不仅有思想能力,而且还有通过理性控制欲望和引导行为的能力。幸福是人所追求的至善,是合于德性的实现活动,有德性者不一定会有幸福,但幸福需要德性——德性的实现活动是幸福人生的必要条件而非充要条件。虽然伦理德性与理智德性的实现可以达至幸福,但幸福的境界有分别——实践德性只是幸福的次境界,"默观"才是幸福的最高境界。在此,亚里士多德的伦理学借助于对"善"的诉求而达到"存在"境界,而其对于"幸福"问题的思考促生了中世纪哲学家关于"存在"的课题研究,从而为托马斯·阿奎那强调幸福更在于思辨理性的动作而非实践理性的动作提供了思想启示。Aristotle believes that virtue is the outstanding performance of real practice of the soul and theperformance of man’s rational function— man not only has the ability to think, but also has the capacityt o control desire and guide behavior through reason. Happiness is the supreme good pursued by peopleand abides by the realization of virtue. Those with virtue may not have happiness, but happiness needsv irtue— the realization of virtue is a necessary condition rather than a sufficient and necessary conditionfor a happy life. Although the realization of ethical virtue and rational virtue can achieve happiness, ther ealm of happiness differs— Practical virtue represents only the secondary realm of happiness, and " con-templation" is the highest realm of happiness. Aristotle’s ethics reached the realm of " existence" with theh elp of the demand for " good", in addition, his thinking on the " happiness" promoted the research onthe subject of " existence" by medieval philosophers, which provided ideological enlightenment for Thom-a s Aquinas to emphasize that happiness lies in the action of speculative rationality rather than the action ofpractical rationality.

关 键 词:幸福 伦理德性 理智德性 实践智慧 默观 

分 类 号:B82-0[哲学宗教—伦理学]

 

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