愤怒促进竞合:基于最后通牒博弈的检验  

Anger improving cooperation in competition:Clues effects based on ultimatum games

作　　者：李娟[1] 魏菲 徐红利[1] LI Juan;WEI Fei;XU Hong-li(School of Management and Engineering,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210008,China;Business School,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210008,China)

机构地区：[1]南京大学工程管理学院,南京210008 [2]南京大学商学院,南京210008

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2021年第12期92-103,共12页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72171113).

摘　　要：为探究愤怒情绪影响企业间竞合关系的机制,基于两次最后通牒博弈构造竞争型成员间分配决策情景,采用组间实验设计,得出决策者伪装愤怒情绪可促进竞争型成员间合作。内在机理是,相较于在真实情绪组,在伪装情绪组中,情绪应答者给情绪表达者提供的分配额无差别,而情绪表达者向情绪应答者表达了较高愤怒情绪水平,即伪装其愤怒情绪水平,并给情绪应答者提供的分配额较低,而受伪装愤怒情绪影响的情绪应答者接受情绪表达者给出分配方案的可能性较高.从愤怒情绪影响成员间分配决策的视角,得出决策者伪装愤怒情绪水平可促进分配交易达成.这为愤怒情绪影响竞争型企业间协调合同设计提供了管理启示.The paper investigates a two-stage ultimatum game and analyzes how expression of anger influences members'profits and allocation decisions to explore how angry emotion affects competitive members'coopeti-tion.By means of a between-subject experiment design,the paper finds that decision makers'strategically ex-pressing angry emotion could enhance cooperation in the competitive setting and could increase the decision makers'profits.Specifically,compared with that in the anger-reporting group,in the anger-pretending group,the receivers of angry emotion provide the same allocations to its competitors.While the expressers of emotion report a higher level of angry emotion,that is,the expressers pretend to be angry,and give lower allocation to their rivals,the relatively higher level of angry emotion makes the receivers of emotion more likely to accept the offers from the expressers of emotion.Our paper argues that decision makers'pretending angry emotions would promote acceptances of allocations rules.The results provide managerial insights on how angry emotion affects the design of coordination contracts in competitive settings.

关 键 词：愤怒情绪 情绪伪装 最后通牒 合作 

分 类 号：F272.2[经济管理—企业管理]