代际传承与家族董事席位超额控制  

Intergenerational Succession and Excess Control of Family Board Seats

作　　者：刘星[1] 苏春 邵欢 LIU Xing;SU Chun;SHAO Huan(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University)

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,400030

出　　处：《经济研究》2021年第12期111-129,共19页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(71232004);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71972017);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71802029)的资助。

摘　　要：本文以2008—2018年沪深A股上市家族企业作为研究样本,考察了代际传承对家族董事席位超额控制程度的影响机制及效应。研究发现,二代接班准备企业的家族董事席位超额控制程度会显著增加,但二代接班上位后企业的家族董事席位超额控制程度则会明显降低;同时,二代海归背景不仅强化了二代接班准备对家族董事席位超额控制程度的正向影响,也削弱了二代接班上位对家族董事席位超额控制程度的负向影响,而二代介入时长则会降低二代接班准备对家族董事席位超额控制程度的提升作用。进一步分析表明,"构建能力权威"和"应对宏观经济下行压力"是代际传承影响家族董事席位超额控制程度的重要机制;并且,二代接班自治后家族董事席位超额控制程度并未出现明显的差异;此外,超额家族董事席位是导致代际传承中企业绩效下滑的重要原因之一。本文不仅有助于我们从新的视角来理解家族董事席位超额控制的形成动因,也丰富了代际传承的相关研究。Intergenerational succession is a major challenge in the development of family firms(Tatoglu et al.,2008;Zhao et al.,2015),which has become an important topic in the field of corporate governance.In fact,intergenerational succession of family firms is a complex and continuous process(Hauck&Prügl,2015),which can be as short as 3—5 years and as long as 10—20 years(Chao,2002).It often involves a long father-son co-governance period(Zhu et al.,2018).And it will make corresponding adjustments to the original board structure and senior management team of family firms.(Hannan&Freeman,1984;Benavides-Velasco et al.,2013,Hu,2016).So,how will the board structure of the family firms be adjusted during the father-son co-governance period?We have explored this issue and provided empirical evidence.According to Peabody’s(1962)classification of authority,authority can be divided into statutory position authority and ability authority with voluntary obedience and active following.When a leader does not have the ability authority,the legitimacy of his position authority will gradually disappear.In the intergenerational succession,although the second generation has a legal status(Li et al.,2015)and can directly obtain position authority,due to young age,inexperienced situation,and the lack of experience of growing together with the organization,its ability authority is usually difficult to be recognized(Li et al.,2015).As such,there may be a difference in the degree of excess control of the family board seats between the second-generation succession preparation stage and the succession stage.This paper takes the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed family firms from 2008 to 2018 as a research sample to examine the influence mechanism and effect of intergenerational succession on the excess control degree of family board seats.It finds that the degree of excess control of family board seats in second-generation succession preparation enterprises has increased significantly;however,after the second generation takes over,the de

关 键 词：家族企业 代际传承 家族董事席位超额控制 二代海归背景 二代介入时长 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51