高管薪酬外部不公平性对成本粘性的影响——基于高管团队特征的调节效应分析  

The Influence of External Unfairness of Executive Compensation on Cost Stickiness——Analysis of the Regulatory Effect Based on the TMT Characteristics

作　　者：吴成颂[1] 田雨霁 WU Chengsong;TIAN Yuji(School of Business,Anhui University,Hefei 230601,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽大学商学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2022年第6期52-61,共10页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(16BGL051)。

摘　　要：以2009—2020年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证分析高管薪酬外部不公平性对企业成本粘性的影响机理,并考察高管团队特征对薪酬外部不公平性与企业成本粘性关系的调节效应。研究结果表明,高管薪酬外部不公平程度的提高显著加剧了企业成本粘性。考虑高管团队特征因素后发现,高管团队女性比例越低、教育水平越低、任职时间越长,薪酬外部不公平性对企业成本粘性的正向影响越显著。进一步检验作用机制发现,加剧代理问题是高管薪酬外部不公平性影响企业成本粘性的主要路径。Based on the data of China s A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2020,the impact mechanism of the external unfairness of executive compensation on cost stickiness is empirically analyzed and the moderating effect of the characteristics of top management team on the relationship between external salary unfairness and enterprise cost stickiness is also explained.The result indicates that the increase of the external unfairness of compensation will significantly aggravate cost stickiness.After considering TMT characteristics,it is found that TMT with less women,lower education level and higher tenure is more likely to aggravate the positive impact of the external unfairness in executive compensation on cost stickiness.Further,the mechanism test found that the external unfairness of executive compensation affects cost stickiness by aggravating managers agency problem.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 外部不公平性 成本粘性 高管团队特征 成本决策 高层梯队理论 代理问题 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]