重审心理变态研究对道德情感主义的经验支持  

Empirical Support of Moral Sentimentalism from Psychopathic Studies Revisited

作　　者：蔡蓁[1] CAI Zhen(Department of Philosophy,East China Normal University,Shanghai 200241,China)

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学哲学系,上海200241

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2023年第2期54-59,共6页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：随着经验科学和伦理学的交叉互动日益增多,古典道德情感主义所重视的经验维度在当代也得到了继承和推进。其核心主张之一是情感对道德判断来说是必要的。关于心理变态的心理学研究由于揭示出情感缺陷和道德判断的缺陷之间的密切关联,因此受到当代情感主义哲学家的关注,并被援引为重要的支持性证据。但是,最近十年间,这些经验证据正在遭受挑战。为了应对这种挑战,情感主义者可以在重新审视相关经验研究的基础上,尝试一方面对相冲突的实验结果给出和情感主义相容的解释,另一方面揭示出实验研究的限度,以及情感在现实条件下的道德判断中,在感知处境、引导推理上发挥的必要作用。With the increasing interaction between empirical science and ethics,the empirical dimension of classical moral sentimentalism has recently re-gained interest.One of its central tenets is that emotions are necessary for making moral judgments.Contemporary sentimentalists have seized on the psy-chopath as an example that favors their position,given the close relationship between emotional deficits and deficits of moral judgment revealed by psycho-pathic studies.However,the empirical evidence appealed to by sentimentalists has been challenged in the past decade.To meet the challenge,sentimen-talists,on one hand,can provide a compatible explanation for the conflicting results,and on the other hand,reveal the limitation of current empirical studies,by exploring the necessary role of emotions played during information processing in the moral judgment of the real world.

关 键 词：心理变态 道德情感主义 情感 道德判断 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]