连锁股东与高管机会主义减持  

Common Ownership and Opportunistic Shareholding Selling Behaviors of Executives

作　　者：黄顺武[1] 潘璐璐 HUANG Shunwu;PAN Lulu(School of Economics,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei,Anhui 230009,China)

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学经济学院,安徽合肥230009

出　　处：《贵州财经大学学报》2023年第3期50-59,共10页Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：伴随着股权分置改革和各类交易制度的陆续推出,内部人交易逐渐成为资本市场“重灾区”并处于金融监管“聚光灯”下。如何规范内部人的交易行为,切实维护资本市场公平竞争秩序,成为资本市场改革迈入深水区必须要应对的问题之一。以2007~2019年A股上市公司作为样本,考察连锁股东是否对内部人交易的数额和频率产生影响。研究发现:连锁股东能够抑制高管机会主义的减持行为;连锁股东通过向上市公司更积极地派遣董事,对高管的自利行为发挥监督作用;异质性分析表明连锁股东对高管机会主义减持行为的负面作用在市场化水平更低、高管团队内断裂带更高和工资结构不平衡的上市公司中更显著。此研究结果可为连锁股东的治理效应提供直接证据,对于如何进一步约束股东高管代理冲突具有参考价值。Along with the shareholding reform and the successive introduction of various trading systems,insider trading has gradually become important in the capital market and is under the"spotlight"of financial supervision.How to regulate the trading behavior of insiders and effectively maintain the fair competition order in the capital market has become one of the issues that must be dealt with as the capital market reform moves into deeper water.This paper uses A-share listed companies from 2007-2019 as a sample to examine whether chain shareholders have an impact on the amount and frequency of insider trading.It is found that:chain shareholders can inhibit opportunistic shareholding reduction by executives;chain shareholders play a monitoring role on executives'self-interest by dispatching directors to listed companies more actively;heterogeneity analysis shows that the negative effect of chain shareholders on opportunistic shareholding reduction by executives is more significant in listed companies with lower marketization level,higher fracture zones within the executive team and unbalanced salary structure.This study provides direct evidence of the governance effects of chain shareholders and is informative on how to further constrain shareholder-executive agency conflicts.

关 键 词：连锁股东 高管减持 机会主义 内部人交易 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]