公平偏好下混改国企双委托人薪酬激励机制研究  

Research on Compensation Incentive Mechanism of Mixed State-owned Enterprise's Double-principal under Fairness Preference

作　　者：朱琪 李燕冰[1,2] 曹文婷[1,2] ZHU Qi;LI Yan-bing;CAO Wen-ting(South China Research Center for Market Economy,Guangzhou,510006,China;College of Economics and Management,South China Normal University,Guangzhou,510006,China)

机构地区：[1]广州大学城华南市场经济研究中心,广东广州510006 [2]华南师范大学经济与管理学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2023年第10期74-84,共11页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助面上项目(71572062);国家社会科学基金重大项目(23ZDA098)。

摘　　要：多委托人代理现象普遍存在,混合所有制改革中,国有企业便存在国有与非国有股东两类差异化委托人,并且经理人行为易受感情因素影响。基于此,本文首先探讨了信息不对称下基于经理人完全理性的双委托人代理激励机制,进一步考虑经理人公平偏好对经理人努力程度及薪酬激励的影响,得出以下主要结论:(1)经理人会考虑两项委托任务的激励差距,倾向完成产出激励系数较高的任务;(2)经理人的最优努力程度与分权水平正相关;(3)经理人的努力程度、激励强度与其嫉妒偏好强度和自豪偏好强度正相关,与其同情偏好强度负相关;(4)在相同情况下,相比于完全理性的经理人,具有公平偏好能提高经理人最优努力程度,具有明显的激励作用。本文有助于丰富公平偏好对委托代理理论影响的研究,对于研究基于混合所有制改革下国有企业控制权分权水平和完善经理人激励机制有启示意义。The mixed ownership economy has been an important implementation form of my China's basic economic system,which pointed out at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee.The 2021 government work report also clearly clarified deepening the reform of mixed ownership.Moreover,the threeyear action plan for the reform of state-owned enterprises(2020-2022)proposes to focus on improving the market-oriented operation mechanism and speed up the construction of the professional manager system.The introduction of these policy documents provides a clear direction for state-owned enterprises in the process of mixed ownership reform,also showed the important influence of executive incentives in state-owned enterprises on corporate governance after the mixed-ownership reform.In the process of mixed ownership reform,stateowned enterprises after reform have two types of differentiated principals,state-owned and non-state-owned shareholders.Both state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital are important participants in corporate decision-making.However,they have consistent economic goals,but conflicting social goals.Different principals have different incentive goals and different incentive models will have different effects on the behaviors of manager.Moreover,manager’s behaviors are susceptible to emotional factors.For this reason,based on the FS model,BO model,and common agency theory,double-principal agency incentive mechanism is explored when manager is fully rational under the condition of information asymmetric further discusses how the effort choice and compensation incentives is effect by considering manager’s fairness preference.Meanwhile,the dynamic evolution process of the influence of the double-principal incentive behavior on the manager’s effort choice under different initial states is simulated through MATLAB software.The main conclusions show that:(1)The manager will consider the incentive gap between the two tasks,and tendency to complete tasks with a higher output incentive coefficient;(2)T

关 键 词：公平偏好 双委托人 激励机制 委托代理 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济] F272.92