论康德伦理学中的直觉主义  

On the Intuitionism in Kant’s Ethics

作　　者：董滨宇[1] DONG Bin-yu

机构地区：[1]中共北京市委党校哲学与文化教研部,北京100044

出　　处：《华东师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2023年第6期60-70,172,共12页Journal of East China Normal University（Humanities and Social Sciences）

基　　金：北京市社会科学基金重点项目“道德建构主义研究”(项目编号:22ZXA005)。

摘　　要：康德伦理学通常被认为是以理性推理为根本特征,道德规范需要建立在以意志自由为基础的实践理性的程序化过程中。为此,以非推理与非反思为特点的直觉主义则往往被认为是与其格格不入的,这种看法有待进一步澄清。如果将直觉主义划分为理性主义和情感主义两种基本形式,那么二者同时蕴含于康德的道德理论中。康德或明或暗地承认直觉在道德判断中具有重要甚至是根本性的作用,而这并不会与他的理性主义基本立场发生真正的冲突。Kant’s ethics is generally regarded as an ethics characterized by rational reasoning,which emphasizes that moral norms need to be established in the procedural process of practical reason based on the freedom of will.Therefore,intuitionism,which is characterized by non-reasoning and non-reflection,is often regarded as incompatible with Kant’s ethics.However,this remains to be discussed.If intuitionism is divided into two basic forms,rationalism and emotionalism,then both are contained in Kant’s moral theory.Kant explicitly or implicitly admits that intuition plays an important and even fundamental role in moral judgment,which does not really conflict with his basic position of rationalism.

关 键 词：理性主义 直觉主义 理性 情感 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]