论情感的伦理价值——基于亚里士多德文本的解读  

The Ethical Value of Emotion:an Interpretation Based on Aristotelian Texts

作　　者：张天姿 ZHANG Tianzi(School of Philosophy,Center for Studies of Values and Culture,Collaborative Innovation Center for Core Socialist Values,Beijing Normal University)

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学哲学学院、价值与文化研究中心、社会主义核心价值观协同创新中心

出　　处：《当代中国价值观研究》2023年第5期33-40,共8页Chinese Journal of Contemporary Values

摘　　要：在非情感主义者眼中,情感之于德性的作用微乎其微。亚里士多德是理性主义者,但他对于情感的态度是温和的,情感在其伦理体系中尤其是道德德性方面具有重要价值。亚里士多德认为,情感是灵魂的一种状态,并不等于德性,但情感本身蕴涵的判断功能在德性的具体实践活动中尤其是对于“适度”的把握具有实质性作用。而且情感和道德德性之间关系密切,个体在实践事务中形成的与情感的“好的关系”,影响着其是否能成为完全具有美德的人。情感的伦理功能,不仅仅限于其具有的判断能力,还在于它对培养道德德性有利。In the eyes of non-emotivism,emotion plays little role in virtue.Aristotle is a rationalist,but his attitude towards emotion is mild,and emotion is of great value in his ethical system,especially in moral virtue.Aristotle believes that emotion is a state of the soul,not equal to virtue,but the judgment function contained by emotion itself plays a substantial role in the concrete practice of virtue,especially in the grasp of“moderation”.Moreover,there is a close relationship between emotion and moral virtue.The“good relationship”with emotion formed in practical affairs affects whether an individual can become a person with full virtue.From this point of view,the ethical value of emotion is not only limited to its judgment ability,but also lies in its benefit to the cultivation of moral virtue.

关 键 词：情感 伦理判断 实践理性 道德德性 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]