业绩变动、董事会治理与高管离职行为研究  

Performance Changes,Board Governance and Turnover Behavior of Senior Management

作　　者：张行[1] Zhang xing(School of Public Administration,Zhong Nan University of Economics and Law)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学应急与公共人力资源管理系

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2024年第3期213-225,I0039,I0040,共15页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：湖北省社科基金重点项目(HBSKJJ2023137);中央基本科研业务费阐释二十大专项(31512241202);中央基本科研业务费项目(2722023EJ022)资助。

摘　　要：本文基于2000—2020年上市公司高管数据,论证了公司业绩与CEO离职率之间的逻辑关系,同时探讨了董事会治理的作用逻辑,为上市公司治理团队建设提供政策建议。研究发现:(1)业绩和CEO离职率间关联性比预期更强,绩效原因导致的CEO离职率占总离职率比重估计值在52%—57%,大于强制型或自愿型离职率所占比重;(2)CEO任期内都可能会发生绩效引致型离职,由于董事会评估CEO能力的准确性随任期增加而提高,CEO任期初绩效引致型离职概率更大,而任期末离职率变小,但下降速度比较缓慢;(3)董事会学习能力可以解释自愿型和强制型离职率的变动,但对绩效引致型离职率变动的解释可能会出现偏差,因为存在多种非绩效因素导致CEO离职;(4)董事会对CEO能力的了解比较缓慢且受到任期内企业绩效变动的冲击,冲击越大,董事会了解的信息越不准确,绩效引致型离职率越低。本文从新视角揭露了上市公司CEO离职的内在机理,传统的强制型和自愿型离职行为可能不全是真相,绩效引致型离职比较容易被忽视。长远来看,关注绩效引致的CEO离职可以帮助企业预防重大绩效风险,实现绩效的长期稳定增长。In the process of promoting Chinese style modernization,various economic entities bear significant responsibilities,among which the role of listed companies as social and economic vitality entities is more prominent.How to improve the governance efficiency and effectiveness of listed companies is a focus and difficulty of attention in academia and the business community.The modernization of governance capacity naturally becomes a powerful tool for the operation and management of listed companies.So how can we achieve modernization of governance capacity?This question is more focused and difficult than the first one.This article,taking this as a breakthrough,points to solve the problem of modernization of listed companies’governance capacity from the per-spectives of board governance and executive team building.The key measurement variable is performance indicators.This is a core indicator for measuring market economic behavior,which is of great significance for understanding the level of corporate governance and management team capabilities of listed companies.This article uses the disclosure database of listed companies and the RESSET financial research database and the theoretical framework of Bayesian learning to explore the relationship between performance changes of listed companies and executive turnover behavior from two aspects of theoretical logic and empirical testing,and analyzes the moderating role of board governance ability and level in the above relationship.Based on learning theory and empirical analysis results,this article has four conclusions:Firstly,the rate of CEO turnover due to performance(52-57%)is generally higher than the rate of forced or voluntary turnover.There is a high correlation between the CEO turnover rate of listed companies and the board’s expectations of the company’s performance during the CEO’s tenure.Secondly,due to the intervention of the board governance,the performance induced turnover rate during the CEO’s term is dynam-ically changing.The key factor in this

关 键 词：业绩变动 董事会治理 离职行为 激励与约束 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F272.91[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51