论康德的良知观  

On Kant’s View of Conscience

作　　者：董滨宇[1] Dong Binyu

机构地区：[1]中共北京市委党校哲学与文化教研部,北京100044

出　　处：《中山大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第4期144-154,共11页Journal of Sun Yat-sen University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：北京市社会科学基金重点项目“道德建构主义研究”(22ZXA005)。

摘　　要：在康德伦理学中,良知是一个充满着诸多争议的问题。对康德而言,良知属于理性还是情感?与此相关,它属于理性慎思还是直觉性反应?就此,学界大体上可以分为情感主义与理性主义两种立场。其实,良知应该属于一种道德直觉,其中蕴含着理性与情感的交融。就产生根源而言,良知在康德那里是一种判断力,也属于一般性的实践理性,但仍然主要呈现为一种道德情感,包含了理性与情感两种心灵状态。作为道德直觉的良知最好从一种自然主义的角度加以理解,在具体的运用过程中,它既有敏锐性、瞬时性的优势,但也由于各种原因而会导致模糊的、歧义的判断。In Kantian ethics,the conscience is always a controversial concept.Is the conscience rational or affective?Does the conscience belong to intelligent deliberation or intuitive response?Generally there are two opposite interpretations:rationalism and sentimentalism.This paper puts forward a point reconciling them:the conscience in Kantian ethics should be a moral intuition fusing reason and feeling.The conscience is the product of judgment,at the same time it belongs to a general practical reason,but radically it is still a moral feeling including reason and feeling.As a moral intuition,the conscience is best grasped from a point of naturalism.In practical operation,the conscience has the advantage of rapidness and acuteness,but will lead to vagueness and divergence for various reason.

关 键 词：良知 道德情感 道德直觉 判断力 理性 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学] B82-0