“恻隐之心”是一种“同情”吗  

Is “the Sense of Compassion” a Kind of “Sympathy”

作　　者：李国斌 LI Guobin(College of Humanities and Arts,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China)

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学人文与艺术学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《齐鲁学刊》2024年第6期14-22,共9页Qilu Journal

摘　　要：当我们将“恻隐之心”置于孟子生活时代的公共伦理观念之下,那么以“怜悯”“同情”等来分析和解释它就显得不足了。人必然生活在特定的伦理关系中,在以“亲亲”为基础建立起来的伦理秩序中,一个人的自然情感先于他的道德情感,缺乏自然情感支持的道德情感不是真正的道德情感。这也使得对陌生人的“恻隐之心”是一种不同于亲人之间的爱欲和责任的情感,它意味着我能够对一个陌生人的处境和遭遇产生同情和怜悯。与爱欲和责任的双向性不同,对陌生人的“恻隐之心”完全是由自我单方面建立起来的伦理关联,它具有行动力量——我应该为那个人的不幸遭遇做点什么,并且只要我愿意就一定能做得到,行动一旦做出就能真正改善那个人的处境。When we consider“the sense of compassion”in the context of the public ethics of the time in which Mencius lived,analyzing and explaining it in terms of“pity”and“sympathy”with simpler terms becomes inadequate.Human beings are bound to live in specific ethical order established based on“affinity for one’s kin”,so one’s natural emotions precede one’s moral emotions,and a moral emotion that lacks the support of natural emotions is not a true moral emotion.This distinction also implies“the sense of compassion”for strangers a different emotion distinct from the love and responsibility felt among relatives.It signifies that one can sympathize with and feel pity for a stranger’s circumstances and plight.Unlike the two-way nature of love and duty between relatives,the sense of compassion for strangers is an ethical connection established entirely by oneself,and it has the power of prompting action,which means that I should do something for someone’s misfortune,and I can do it if I want to.Once the action is taken,it has the potential to genuinely improve that person’s situation..

关 键 词：孟子 恻隐之心 道德情感 自然情感 

分 类 号：B222[哲学宗教—中国哲学]